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MUNICIPAL ZONING OF ABORTION CLINICS:
THE FRAMINGHAM CLINIC, INC. v. ZONING
BOARD OF APPEALS
First trimester abortion' clinics, when attempting to locate within
municipalities, often meet with stubborn resistance from local offi-
cials.2 Zoning administrators use a variety of techniques in attempt-
ing to exclude the clinics.' The most common technique is to deny
1. The United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of abortions in
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Court stated that under the due process
clause, a woman's right to choose an abortion is a fundamental right. Therefore, a
state cannot prohibit it, or burden it significantly, during the first trimester of preg-
nancy. Id. at 164. All that a state could require is that a first trimester abortion be
performed by a licensed physician. Id. at 165.
In the companion case of Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the Court held that
first trimester abortions do not have to be performed in a licensed hospital. The court
found no reasonable relationship between hospital accreditation and any compelling
state interest. Id. at 193-95. The Court reaffirmed this position in Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), holding that in the first trimester of preg-
nancy, the state cannot interfere with either the abortion decision or with the physi-
cian-patient relationship unless there is a compelling countervailing state interest. Id.
at 64. See generally Note, Implications of the Abortion Decisions Post Roe and Doe
Litigation and Legislation, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 237 (1974); 26 DRAKE L. REv. 716
(1977).
2. See, e.g., Framingham Clinic, Inc. v. Selectmen of Southborough, 373 Mass.
279, 367 N.E.2d 606 (1977). Shortly after the Framingham Clinic had obtained assur-
ance that its use would not be in violation of any applicable zoning ordinance,
Southborough approved an amendment to its zoning by-law adding"Abortion Clin-
ics" to its list of prohibited uses. Id. at 282, 367 N.E.2d at 608.
The issues in the Framingham case are substantially different from those decided in
the Southborough decision. In Southborough, the town attempted to exclude the use
of land for an abortion clinic, while the city of Framingham wanted the Clinic to
obtain a special building permit. Brief for Appellants at 5, Framingham Clinic v.
Zoning Bd. of Appeals, - Mass. -, 415 N.E.2d 840 (1981). In Southborough, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the ban against abortion clinics un-
justly discriminated against and unduly burdened a woman's constitutional right to a
first trimester abortion. 373 Mass. at 285, 367 N.E.2d at 610. In Framingham, the
court never reached the constitutional issue. See supra note 7.
3. See, e.g., Mahoning Women's Center v. Hunter, 610 F.2d 456 (6th Cir. 1979)
(after Center leased space for use as a first trimester abortion clinic, the city enacted
an ordinance requiring all first trimester abortions to be performed in a hospital);
Word v. Poelker, 495 F.2d 1349 (8th Cir. 1974) (applicant for an abortion clinic li-
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building permits.4 In The Framingham Clinic, Inc. v. Zoning Board of
Appeals,5 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that,
pursuant to the town's zoning by-law, 6 the town must grant a build-
ing permit to a proposed abortion clinic as a matter of law.7 The
decision promises to restrict hostile municipalities from construing
their zoning ordinances in bad faith in order to exclude abortion clin-
ics from within their borders.
The Framingham Clinic, a proposed first trimester abortion clinic,"
cense required to disclose inter alia, his training, what he had done for the last five
years, and the names of all physicians using the facilities to perform abortions); West
Side Women's Servs., Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 450 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Ohio 1978)
(after abortion clinic had secured a zoning permit, the city council passed an ordi-
nance prohibiting the issuance of abortion service licenses in the district); Fox Hill
Surgery Clinic, Inc. v. City of Overland Park, No. 77-4120 (D. Kan. July 11, 1977)
(order granting preliminary injunction) (tract of land once zoned for a surgery clinic
was rezoned when intended use as abortion clinic was discovered).
4. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Citizens for Community Action, 558 F.2d 861
(8th Cir. 1977). When a family planning organization purchased a facility intended
for a first trimester abortion clinic, the St. Paul City Council, motivated by public
opposition to the construction of the facility, passed a six-month moratorium on the
construction of separate abortion facilities. The city architect then refused to issue a
building permit until the moratorium expired. Id. at 863-64.
5. - Mass. -, 415 N.E.2d 840 (1981).
6. - Mass. at -, 415 N.E.2d at 844. The court describes the Framingham zoning
by-law.
The by-law divides the town into six classes of districts, the first two of which are
"residence districts" and "business districts." § IIA(1) and (2). Uses permitted in
a residence district include, among others, a "[p]rofessional office. . . within the
principal residence of a physician. . . provided that not more than two other
persons are regularly employed therein," . . . , § IIIA(l)(c), and "private and
public hospitals and dormitories accessory thereto," § IIIA(l)(d). Section IIIF of
the by-law sets forth the uses permitted in business districts. Section IIIF(l)(a)
permits "[a]ll uses that are permitted in General Residence Districts. . . ." Use
of a property for "[b]usiness or professional offices" is permitted by § IIIF(l)(c).
The following section, § IIIF(l)(d), lists specifically thirty-nine permitted uses,
ranging from "baker" to "wheelwright," then authorizes "such other uses as the
Board of Appeals may grant."
- Mass. at -, 415 N.E.2d at 844-45.
7. - Mass. at -, 415 N.E.2d at 845. The by-law under consideration in the
Framingham case should be distinguished from the by-law invalidated in the
Southborough decision. See supra note 2. The court, in Framingham, stated that a
proper interpretation of the Framingham by-law would not create an outright ban of
abortion clinics. This was contrary to the interpretation of the Southborough by-law.
Id. at--, 415 N.E.2d at 848 n.10. This observation allowed the Framingham court to
bypass the constitutional issue. See supra note 2.
8. - Mass. at -, 415 N.E.2d at 842. Gynecological services would also be pro-
vided at the Clinic. From its review of a preliminary floor plan, the court believed
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applied to the Framingham building commissioner9 for permission to
locate within a business district permitting "hospitals" and "profes-
sional offices."" ° In response to public opposition against this appli-
cation,II the commissioner informed the Clinic that it would need a
special building permit 2 from the zoning board of appeals. 3 In
reaching this decision, the commissioner reasoned that the Clinic was
not a "professional office" within the meaning of the by-law. 4 The
that the proposed six-room outpatient facility would include a laboratory, a treatment
room for performing abortions, and recovery rooms for immediate postoperative care.
The court then assumed that, in the absence of any contrary allegations, the facility
complied with all state health requirements. Id.
9. Id. For an explanation of the building commissioner's responsibilities, see in-
fra note 24 and accompanying text.
10. Id. at -, 415 N.E.2d at 844. See supra note 6.
11. Id. at -, 415 N.E.2d at 843. Prior to this opposition, the building commis-
sioner had stated in a letter to the clinic that "he considered the Clinic's proposed use
to be a '[b]usiness or professional office,' a use permitted as of right by the applicable
provisions of the by-law." Id.
Pursuant to the building commissioner's preliminary opinion, the Clinic purchased
the property to be used for their operations, and sought approval of a parking plan.
Id. This could be considered a material change of position by the Clinic subsequent
to an assurance that the municipality would issue a building permit. In such circum-
stances, courts often deem that the developer holds a vested property right. See, e.g.,
Town of Largo v. Imperial Homes Corp., 309 So.2d 571, 572 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975); People ex rel. Skokie Town House Builders, Inc. v. Village of Morton Grove,
16 Ill. 2d 183, 191, 157 N.E.2d 33, 36 (1959).
12. The commissioner is granted the authority to issue special permits in the Mas-
sachusetts Zoning Enabling Act. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 40A §§ 9, 10 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1981).
Municipalities grant special permits for proposed facilities that are considered es-
sential or desirable for the welfare of the community and its citizens. The proposed
facility may not be appropriate at every location, without restrictions or conditions
being imposed. These restrictions prevent special problems concerning traffic conges-
tion, safety, health and noise. The state zoning enabling act permits a municipality to
require agency approval of the location of any special district facility. See Tullo v.
Millburn Township, 54 N.J. Super. 483, 490-91, 149 A.2d 620, 624-25 (1959).
13. Section 8 of the Massachusetts Zoning Enabling Act provides for appeals to
the local zoning board of appeals by persons aggrieved from action of the zoning
enforcement officer or building commissioner. Section 17 provides for appeals from
the zoning board to the superior court. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 40A, §§ 8, 17 (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1981).
14. - Mass. at -, 415 N.E.2d at 843. Among the building commissioner's rea-
sons for denying a building permit to the Clinic was his view that abortions would not
"promote life." The by-law expressly required his use of this criterion. Id. Although
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held here that "the Clinic's entitlement to
a building permit turned solely on a correct interpretation of the by-law," id. at -,
415 N.E.2d at 849, the court has previously held that a zoning board of appeals may
1983]
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zoning board upheld his determination. 5 The Clinic then appealed
to Superior Court, claiming that this bad faith construction of the
zoning ordinances was a violation of the due process clause, 6 which
enables a woman to secure a first trimester abortion without interfer-
ence.17 Without reaching this constitutional issue, 18 the trial judge
ruled that the clinic was a permissible use, and deserved a building
permit as of right."9 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court af-
firmed, holding that regardless of whether the proposed Clinic was
strictly a "hospital" or a "professional office," its function was within
the range of uses permitted in Framingham's business districts.20
Like most states,21 Massachusetts authorizes municipalities to en-
act administrative procedures that implement zoning requirements.22
These procedures require application for a building permit before er-
not assert an opinion of the social value of a proposed facility when denying a build-
ing permit. See Baker v. Planning Bd., 353 Mass. 141, 228 N.E.2d 831 (1967) (town
planning board exceeded its authority when it disapproved a subdivision sewerage
plan because it assumed that the disapproval would be in the public interest); Daley
Constr. Co. v. Planning Bd., 340 Mass. 149, 163 N.E.2d 27 (1959) (planning board
exceeded its authority when it disapproved a subdivision plan because it believed that
existing water sources would be strained); McCaffrey v. Board of Appeals, 4 Mass.
App. Ct. 109, 343 N.E.2d 154 (1976) (when apartment was entitled to a building per-
mit as of right, zoning board could not require a special permit).
15. - Mass. at -, 415 N.E.2d at 844. Politics often cause zoning boards to ignore
individual property rights and rational land use planning in order to meet political
necessities. Note, Land Use Control in Metropolitan Areas: The Failure of Zoning and
a Proposed Alternative, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 335, 342 (1974). See generally Develop-
ments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1427, 1431 (1978).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
17. See supra note 1. See also Reply Brief for Appellants at 2. The Clinic at-
tempted to convince the court on appeal that since the city could not exclude abortion
clinics after Southborough, it sought to use a bad faith construction of its zoning by-
law to achieve this unconstitutional end. Id. See supra note 2.
18. See supra note 7.
19. -Mass. at--, 415 N.E.2d at 844. The judge not only granted summary judg-
ment for the Clinic, but also directed the Superior Court to retain jurisdiction over the
matter "to ensure that the relief granted herein is not frustrated by further arbitrary,
capricious and discriminatory conduct on the part of the defendants." Id.
20. Id. at -, 415 N.E.2d at 846.
21. See, e.g., ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CITY PLANNING AND ZONING, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT (rev. ed. 1926).
Most state enabling acts are modeled after this standard act, which delegates state
police power to municipalities, so they may zone to promote the health, safety, morals
or general welfare of the community. See Note,,Abortion Clinic Zoning: The Right to
Procreative Freedom andthe Zoning Power, 5 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 282, 284 (1979).
22. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 40A (Law. Co-op. 1973 & Supp. 1981).
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ecting or altering a structure.23 This requirement provides zoning au-
thorities with knowledge of the contemplated use and enables them
to determine whether that use complies with existing zoning
regulations.24
When the permit application pertains to a contemplated use well
within the zoning requirements, the municipality does not have the
authority to deny the permit.25 In Fellsway Realty Corp. v. Building
Commissioner of AMedford,26 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court upheld this proposition by stating that the building commis-
sioner had no authority to refuse issuance of the permit.27
23. Id. §§ 9-13. The Massachusetts zoning enabling act authorizes municipalities
to regulate nonconforming uses, id. § 9, and variances, id. § 10; to review special per-
mit applications, id. § 11; and to grant power to a zoning board of appeals, id. § 12,
and to a zoning administrator, id. § 13.
24. 8 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.150 (3d ed. 1980). In order
to enforce zoning restrictions, the Massachusetts zoning enabling act provides:
The Inspector of buildings, building commissioner or local inspector, or if there
are none, in a town, the board of selectmen, or person or board designated by
local ordinance or by-law, shall be charged with the enforcement of the zoning
ordinance or by-law and shall withhold a permit for the construction, alteration
or moving of any building or structure if the building or structure as constructed,
altered or moved would be in violation of any zoning ordinance or by-law....
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 40A § 7 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1981).
25. 8 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 24, § 25.150. See also infra note 28.
26. 332 Mass. 471, 125 N.E.2d 791 (1955).
27. Id. at 472, 125 N.E.2d at 792. The plans and specifications for the proposed
structures complied in all ways with the city building code. Id. at 471, 125 N.E.2d at
791-92. The Massachusetts courts have held that the issuance of permits is a purely
ministerial act. In Ouellette v. Building Inspector, 362 Mass. 272, 285 N.E.2d 423
(1972), the court held that when a building inspector acts outside the scope of his
authority by refusing to issue a lawfully mandated permit, mandamus would be the
appropriate remedy. Id. at 279, 285 N.E.2d at 427. In Caputo v. Board of Appeals,
330 Mass. 107, 111 N.E.2d 674 (1953), the court held that the building commissioner's
failure to grant a permit for the erection of a structure that complied with the zoning
ordinances was violative of the city building code. Id. at 110, 111 N.E.2d at 676.
Massachusetts has also held that a building commissioner or zoning board must
strictly follow the provisions of a zoning ordinance. Otherwise "[t]he right to build
would be utterly lacking in substance if its exercise could be prevented by the arbi-
trary and capricious refusal of a permit, or if the granting or denial of the permit
rested in the discretion of some official or board." Kenney v. Building Comm'r, 315
Mass. 291, 293-94, 52 N.E.2d 683, 685 (1943). But cf. Holbrook v. Board of
Selectmen, 354 Mass. 769, 238 N.E.2d 366 (1968) (mandamus to compel issuance of a
building permit was properly denied because property owner had failed to exhaust his
administrative remedy by appealing to the zoning board of appeals).
Other states have also held that when a proposed structure conforms to the building
code and zoning ordinance, the building inspector must issue the permit as a matter
of law. See, e.g., Ellis v. City Council, 222 Cal. App. 2d 490, 35 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1963)
1983]
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When the contemplated use is an abortion clinic, courts vary in
determining whether the particular zoning district permits that use.2"
Depending on the permitted uses within a city's zoning code,29 these
clinics have been restricted to areas allowing "medical and dental
clinics,"3 "hospitals,"'" and "business and professional offices."32 A
New York Supreme Court, in State v. Mitchell,33 classified an abor-
tion clinic as an "out-of-hospital health facility" for licensing and
regulatory purposes." In Mitchell, a businessman was prohibited
from soliciting pregnant women from Michigan to come to a New
York clinic in order to obtain abortions.35 The court disagreed with
defendant's contention that his proposed abortion clinic was similar
to a doctor's office.36 It based its decision on the lack of any doctor-
(writ of mandate to compel issuance of swimming pool construction permit that
building inspector had arbitrarily refused); United States Home Dev. Corp. v.
LaMura, 89 N.J. Super. 254, 214 A.2d 538 (1965) (action by developer to compel
issuance of building permit for subdivision); Quadrant Corp. v. City of Kinston, 22
N.C. App. 31, 205 S.E.2d 324 (1974) (building inspector had no discretion to withhold
requested building permit where applicable zoning restrictions permitted construction
of apartment building); Lohman v. City of Aberdeen, 246 N.W.2d 781 (S.D. 1976)
(mandamus lies when refusal to approve a plat of land is withheld arbitrarily and
capriciously). See generally I A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING,
§ 9.03 (4th ed. 1982).
28. Courts often have to characterize abortion clinics because this use is not spe-
cifically categorized by most zoning ordinances. Since abortions were imegal in most
states prior to 1973, only 178 abortion clinics existed at that time. The general lack of
response from hospitals to the legalization of abortions led to a rapid increase in the
numbers of abortion clinics. By 1977, there were 522 clinics nationwide. See Note,
Obstructionist Activities at Abortion Clinics: A Framework for Remedial Litigation, 8
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325, 328-29 (1979). See also Note, supra note 21.
29. A city zoning code will usually contain a list of specific property uses that are
permitted within a district as a matter of right. Developments in the Law-Zoning,
supra note 15, at 1434.
30. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text. See also People v. Wickersham
Medical Center, 69 Misc. 2d 196, 333 N.Y.S.2d 366 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (abortion clinic
classified as a hospital, requiring the approval of the public health council prior to
opening).
32. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
33. 66 Misc. 2d 514, 321 N.Y.S.2d 756 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
34. Id. at 521, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 762-63. An "out-of-hospital health facility" re-
quired the approval of the New York Public Health Council before it could open. Id.
35. Id. at 515, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 758. At the time of the case, abortions were illegal
in Michigan, but legal in New York. Id.
36. Id. at 519, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 761.
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patient relationship.37 The court then held that since the facility was
more like a hospital than a doctor's office, it should be subject to the
same regulations as a hospital.3" Because it had failed to receive the
requisite approval of the New York Public Health Council, the clinic
was enjoined from continued operation.39
A district court in Louisiana indirectly classified an abortion clinic
as a hospital in Bossier City Medical Suite v. Bossier City.40 In Bossier
City, the zoning administrator denied an occupancy permit4' to an
abortion clinic in a zoning district that allowed doctors' offices. 42 The
city zoning code categorized these offices as "medical or dental clin-
ics."'43 Hospitals, as well as operating rooms for major surgery, were
prohibited uses within that district.' Classifying an abortion as ma-
jor surgery,45 the court upheld the zoning administrator's denial of an
37. Id. at 514, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 756. The court stated that the clinic was similar to
a hospital because patients would come to receive medical service, regardless of the
doctor administering it. "Patients are merely being brought or solicited to come to a
place where abortions are performed instead of coming to see a particular doctor."
Id. at 519, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 761. The court also distinguished the clinic from a doc-
tor's office because it openly advertised for patients, something that doctors were pro-
hibited from doing in New York. Id.
38. Id. at 521, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 762. Under New York's State Public Health Law,
a "hospital" is defined as "a facility or institution engaged principally in providing
services by or under the supervision of a physician." N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2801
(McKinney 1977). Neither the court nor the public health law defined "doctor's
office."
39. See supra note 34.
40. 483 F. Supp. 633 (W.D. La. 1980).
41. Id. at 639. An occupancy permit is different from a building permit. Al-
though zoning administrators use both devices to ensure compliance with zoning reg-
ulations, building permits are ineffective once permission for construction or
alteration has been given. An occupancy permit, however, ensures conformity to pro-
posed plans and specifications after a building is completed and inspected. See gener-
ally 3 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 17.02-.03 (2d ed. 1977).
42. 483 F. Supp. at 639 n.4.
43. Id. The Bossier City zoning ordinance permitted dental or medical clinics in
their B- I Transition Business Districts. "A building in which one or more physicians,
dentists, and allied professional assistants are engaged in carrying on their profession;
the clinic may include inpatient care or operating rooms for minor surgery." Id. But
cf. People ex rel. D'Iorio v. Alfa Realty Co., 69 Misc. 2d 475, 330 N.Y.S.2d 403 (N.Y.
City Ct. 1972) (prohibited a methadone maintenance program clinic from locating in
a zone prohibiting hospitals).
44. 483 F. Supp. at 633. Bossier City originally permitted hospitals in the B-1
Transition Business District, but because of traffic congestion and the need for other
business in proximity, hospitals were restricted to B-3 districts. Id. at 649.
45. 483 F. Supp. at 640. The Louisiana "informed consent" statute, describing
19831
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occupancy certificate.46
The confusion regarding the classification of abortion clinics is also
apparent in Long v. Elk Grove Village.47 The plaintiff in Long ap-
plied for a building permit in order to construct an ambulatory surgi-
cal treatment center.48 An Illinois statute describes this as a place
devoted to the performance of surgical procedures, including abor-
tions.49 The trial court ruled that the proposed abortion clinic be
granted the building permit as of right in a zone permitting "business
and professional offices" such as a doctor's office." As in Bossier
City, "hospitals" were prohibited in this zone.5 Refusing to grant
the building permit, the Illinois Court of Appeals reversed and re-
manded the case for an evidentiary hearing, to determine if the pro-
posed clinic was more like a "business and professional office" or a
"hospital." 52
The Kentucky Supreme Court, in Crain v. City of Louisville,53
looked to the function of the structure involved to interpret the terms
of the municipal zoning ordinance. In Crain, the municipality
granted a building permit to a nursing home, even though nursing
what a woman must be told before she can have an abortion, defines abortion as
major surgery. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.6(B) (West Supp. 1982). But see
Fox Hill Surgery Clinic, Inc. v. City of Overland Park, No. 77-4120 (D. Kan. July 11,
1977) (order granting preliminary injunction) (abortion is a minor surgery
procedure).
46. 483 F. Supp. at 640.
47. 64 Ill. App. 3d 1006, 382 N.E.2d 79 (1978).
48. Id. at 1007, 382 N.E.2d at 81.
49. Id. at 1009, 382 N.E.2d at 82. The Ambulatory Surgical Treatment Center
Act provided that such facilities could not provide beds or accommodations for a
patient's overnight stay. The act also expressly excluded from its scope those institu-
tions that were licensed pursuant to the Hospital Licensing Act. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
111 1/2, § 157-8.3(A) (Smith-Hurd 1977).
50. Id. at 1007, 382 N.E.2d at 80. Based upon the pleadings, the Ambulatory
Surgical Treatment Center Act and the village zoning ordinance, the trial court ruled
that the denial of a permit was unreasonable and arbitrary. The court therefore or-
dered the village to issue the construction permit. Id.
'51. Id. at 1009, 382 N.E.2d at 82. The ordinance permitted retail sales, consumer
service, business and professional offices and institutional and governmental uses
within the district. Id.
52. Id. at 1010, 382 N.E.2d at 82. The court remanded to determine the time of
use, possible traffic patterns, emergency vehicle use and the extent of service related to
the proposed facility. Id.
53. 298 Ky. 421, 182 S.W.2d 787 (1944).
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homes were not explicitly permitted by the zoning code.54 The dis-
trict involved did allow "hospitals" and "boarding and lodging
houses" however." The court held that the function of a nursing
home was within the functions implied in the plain meanings of these
two permitted uses.56 Thus, the court created a "range of uses" ra-
tionale to explain its holding-that permitted uses were not limited to
those explicitly stated in the zoning ordinance.57
Framingham's by-law did not define the terms "hospital" or "busi-
ness or professional office." 58 Consequently, the Supreme Judicial
54. Id. at 424, 182 S.W.2d at 789. Since "hospitals" were not defined in the zon-
ing ordinance, the court used the common dictionary definition, noting that they are
institutions for the reception and treatment of the sick or injured, differing in kind
according to the class of persons served. Id. at 424, 182 S.W.2d at 789-90. Courts
generally use the common meanings of words in the absence of definitions in the
ordinance. See infra notes 57-58.
55. 298 Ky. 423, 182 S.W.2d at 789. Cf. N.R. Fairbanks Co. v. City of Blaine, 308
Minn. 315, 242 N.W.2d 99 (1976) (unreasonable for the city to deny a special use
permit for a combination retail sales and automotive service operation merely be-
cause the proposed hybrid use was not explicitly listed in the zoning code); Petition of
North Mansuring Wildlife Sanctuary, 52 Misc. 2d 96, 274 N.Y.S.2d 915 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1966) (failure of an ordinance to state that bird and wildlife sanctuaries were
permitted did not exclude such use).
56. 298 Ky. 425, 182 S.W.2d at 790. The court stated that "whether appellant's
institution be regarded strictly as a hospital or not, it has the attribute of both a hospi-
tal and a boarding house." Id.
The court noted, similar to the Framingham court, that the function of a structure,
not its name, is the controlling fact. Id. at 423, 182 S.W.2d at 789. See also Carpenter
v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 352 Mass. 54, 223 N.E.2d 679 (1967). "[I]t is the use to
which the premises are put rather than the external indicia of use which is controlling
under the by-law." Id. at 59, 223 N.E.2d at 683. See generally 1 A. RATHKOPF, supra
note 27, § 9.06.
57. 298 Ky. at 425, 182 S.W.2d at 790. The court explained its "range of uses"
methodology in the following manner.
While perhaps [a nursing home] could not be characterized as either [a hospital
or boarding house] exclusively, it is certainly something in between the two es-
tablishments and, as the ordinance permits use for either purpose, it must be
construed as permitting use of an institution that is between the two in character,
for the extremes include the mean.
Id.
58. Although Framingham's by-law does not expressly define hospitals, some
zoning ordinances do so indirectly. The Residential Four (R-4) district of Lakewood,
Colorado permits "[h]ospitals, nursing homes and clinics, but not including institu-
tions exclusively for the mentally disturbed, mental defectives or for contagious or
infectious diseases." Humana, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 189 Colo. 79, 84, 537
P.2d 741, 744 (1975). The Hospital District of Metheum, Massachusetts permits
"(1) Hospital; (2) Clinic; (3) Diagnostic or treatment facility; (4) Professional office
building for physicians, surgeons, dentists and other medical and para-medical and
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Court of Massachusetts, in Framingham Clinic, used the plain mean-
ing of these words in interpreting the by-law. 9 The court held that a
para-dental personnel ... ; (5) Nursing home, extended care, convalescent or rest
home facility.. ." Woodland Estates, Inc. v. Building Inspector, 4 Mass. App. Ct.
757, 758 n.2, 358 N.E.2d 468, 468 n.2 (1976).
Courts have also permitted various other facilities to come under definition of
"hospital" in zoning ordinances. See, e.g., School Lane Hills, Inc. v. East Hempfield
Township Zoning Hearing Bd., 18 Pa. Commw. 519, 336 A.2d 901 (1975) (rehabilita-
tion center for crippled children and adults); State ex rel. Lyon v. Snohomish County
Bd. of Adjustment, 9 Wash. App. 446, 512 P.2d 1114 (1973) (alcoholic recovery-reha-
bilitation-intermediate care center); Scerbo v. Board of Adjustment, 121 N.J. Super.
378, 297 A.2d 207 (1972) (narcotic rehabilitation and treatment center); Kastendike v.
Baltimore Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc., 267 Md. 389, 297 A.2d 745 (1972) (nurs-
ing home for retarded adults). See generally Annot., 27 A.L.R.3d 1028 (1969).
Zoning ordinances do not generally define "professional offices," but instead pro-
vide for professional offices to be permitted as an accessory use in residential districts.
These zoning provisions arise because municipalities recognize that professionals
often have offices in their homes. Annot., 24 A.L.R.3d 1128, 1129-30 (1969). But cf.
Seaman v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 340 Mass. 488, 165 N.E.2d 97 (1960) (real estate
brokerage was not a professional use for zoning purposes); Building Comm'r v. Mc-
Manus, 263 Mass. 270, 160 N.E. 887 (1928) (undertaker's business was not a profes-
sional use for zoning purposes).
59. - Mass. at -, 415 N.E.2d at 845. Courts generally interpret municipal zon-
ing ordinances in the same manner as state statutes, focusing on ascertaining legisla-
tive intent from the language of the ordinance. See, e.g., Martin v. King, 417 F.2d
458 (10th Cir. 1969) (same rules of construction are to be applied to any legislative
enactments, whether statute or ordinance); Tower Realty, Inc. v. City of East Detroit,
196 F.2d 710 (6th Cir. 1952) (same presumption of constitutionality that applies to
state statute should be applied to ordinances of a city government); Town of Clayton
v. Colorado & S. Ry. Co., 51 F.2d 977 (10th Cir. 1931) (when legislative intent can be
discerned from looking to the provisions of a statute as a whole, the real purpose of
the legislative body prevails over a literal reading of the statute); Anderson v. Town
of Forest Park, 239 F. Supp. 576 (W.D. Okla. 1965) (look to the municipality's broad
purpose in enacting an ordinance). See generally 6 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 24,§§ 20.38-.45; 1 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 27, § 9.03.
Courts have generally held that the legislative intent behind municipal zoning ordi-
nances requires strictly construing restrictions on the use of property in favor of the
property owner. The rationale behind this procedure is that zoning ordinances are in
derogation of the common law right of private ownership. The freedom of a property
owner to use his property in any manner, therefore, should be emphasized in inter-
preting zoning ordinances unless there are clearly articulated limitations. See 3 R.
ANDERSON, supra note 41, § 16.02; 8 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 24, § 20.51; 1 A,
RATHKoPF, supra note 27, § 9.03.
Additionally, it is settled law in Massachusetts that in the absence of an express
definition of a term used in a zoning ordinance, it is assumed that the municipality
intended the term to be given its ordinary meaning. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Zone Book, Inc., 372 Mass. 366, 361 N.E.2d 1239 (1977) (usual and accepted mean-
ings of "books" and "magazines"); Shuman v. Board of Aldermen, 361 Mass. 758,282
N.E.2d 653 (1972) (common meaning of "dormitory"); Jackson v. Building Inspector,
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first trimester abortion clinic was within the range of permissible uses
in Framingham's business districts-somewhere along a continuum
between the plain meanings of "professional office" and "hospital."60
By this method, the court placed less importance on classifying an
abortion clinic as either a professional office or a hospital, and looked
instead to the purpose behind the proposed clinic-the "delivery of
medical services."6 1
Framingham had no restrictions in its by-law similar to those in
Bossier City, which limited clinics to minor surgery procedures. 2
Framingham's by-law can also be distinguished from those in Bossier
351 Mass. 472, 221 N.E.2d 736 (1966) (common meaning of "farming"); Kurz v.
Board of Appeals, 341 Mass. 110, 167 N.E.2d 627 (1960) (ordinary meaning of "edu-
cational use"). Courts have also assumed the plain meanings of undefined terms
within ordinances. See generally 3 R. ANDERSON, supra note 41, § 16.05; 6 E. Mc-
QUILLIN, supra note 24, § 20.47.
Several states, including Massachusetts, have held that a definition given in a state
statute is irrelevant in determining the meaning intended in a local zoning ordinance,
absent a manifest intent to incorporate the statutory meaning. E.g., County of Lake
v. Gateway Houses Found., 19 IMI. App. 3d 318, 311 N.E.2d 371 (1974) (definition of
"treatment" and "drug addiction" in an Illinois statute held as not controlling the
meaning of "treatment center for drug addiction" in local zoning ordinance);
Manchester v. Phillips, 343 Mass. 591, 180 N.E.2d 333 (1962) (Massachusetts statute
defining "mobile home" did not control the definition of "mobile home" in a munici-
pal zoning ordinance).
60. - Mass. at -, 415 N.E.2d at 846. The court noted that although other courts
have expressed concern over the meaning of the term "professional office,"
§ IIIA(I)(c) of Framingham's by-law explicitly states that a physician's office is a pro-
fessional use. Id. The court noted that Webster's New International Dictionary de-
fines "profession" as a "calling in which one professes to have acquired some special
knowledge used by way either of instructing, guiding or advising others, or of serving
them in some art." Id. See supra note 58.
A hospital is commonly defined as "an institution providing health services, pri-
marily for inpatients, and medical or surgical care of the sick or injured including as
an integral part of the institution, such related facilities as laboratories, outpatient
departments, training facilities, central service facilities, and staff offices." 3 R. AN-
DERSON, supra note 41, § 16.05. See supra note 58.
61. - Mass. at -, 415 N.E.2d at 847. The court noted that since both doctors'
offices and private hospitals were permitted, an abortion clinic, "however labeled,
seems plainly to be within the range of uses allowing in Framingham's business dis-
tricts." Id. at -, 415 N.E.2d at 846. The court also noted that the relevant considera-
tion was whether an abortion clinic fit into the category of a facility used for the
delivery of medical services. "When a municipality allows as of right uses which lie
at both ends of the spectrum in terms of a particular category of uses-here, the deliv-
ery of medical services-less importance need be attached to fixing precisely where on
that spectrum a specified use lies." Id. at -, 415 N.E.2d at 847.
62. See supra note 43.
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City63 and Long' because both hospitals and business or profes-
sional offices are permitted within Framingham's business districts. 65
Thus, the Framingham Clinic court was able to apply Crain's "range
of uses" rationale to abortion clinics.6 6 As in Crain, this rationale
was interpreted as the legislative intent of the by-law. 67 Most impor-
tantly, pursuant to its holding in Fellsway Realty,68 the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court held that since the Clinic had clearly demon-
strated that it was permitted under Framingham's zoning by-law, the
building commissioner was required, as a matter of law, to issue a
permit.69
Because the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court did not regard
specific nomenclature as important, the absence of the word "clinic"
from Framingham's by-law as a permitted use was not dispositive.70
The court looked to the function of the proposed clinic, delivery of
medical services, as controlling.7" Although abortions would be per-
63. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
64. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
65. See supra note 6. By cumulative zoning such as this, residences or hospitals
are permitted in districts zoned for light industry or commercial uses. See generally
Developments in the La--Zoning, supra note 15, at 1429. The modem trend is away
from cumulative zoning, in order to prevent economic injury to commercial or indus-
trial units caused by the presence of residential units. 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 41,
§ 9.14-.38.
66. - Mass. at -, 415 N.E.2d at 846.
67. The court did not explicitly state that the "range of uses" rationale followed
the legislative intent of the by-law. This is implied, however, throughout the opinion.
The court states, for example, that it is using ordinary principles of statutory construc-
tion in interpreting Framingham's by-law. - Mass. at -, 415 N.E.2d at 945. This
included looking to the plain meanings of words "from sources presumably known to
the [by-law's] enactors." Id., citing Commonwealth v. Zone Book, Inc., 372 Mass.
366, 369, 361 N.E.2d 1239, 1240 (1977).
68. Fellsway Realty Corp. v. Building Comm'r, 332 Mass. 471, 472, 125 N.E.2d
791, 792 (1955). See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
69. - Mass. at -, 415 N.E.2d at 849. The court noted that the clinic would not
be automatically entitled to a building permit simply because the town officials had
interpreted the by-law unreasonably. Id. at -, 415 N.E.2d at 848. Since the clinic
had demonstrated in superior court that it was entitled to a permit, the supreme court
could compel the commissioner to issue the permit. Id. at -, 415 N.E.2d at 849.
70. Id. at -, 415 N.E.2d at 846. Cf. Montgomery County Mental Health Clinic v.
Norristown Borough, 86 Montgomery Co. L. Rptr. 194 (1965) (since "clinic" was not
mentioned in the zoning ordinance, it was reasonable to conclude that a mental
health clinic, with outpatient care, was intended to be included in the term
"hospital").
71. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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formed on an outpatient basis only, the court deemed this single cri-
terion insufficient to differentiate the clinic from a hospital.72 The
fact that the clinic proposed to employ nurses and trained counselors,
as well as doctors, to assist in the "delivery of medical services," and
required a laboratory, treatment room and recovery rooms did not
take the clinic beyond the character of a "professional office."7 3
Moreover, the court stated that there would be nothing unusual
about the frequency of the clinic's use to differentiate it from other
professional uses.7 4
The Framingham Clinic decision will enable courts to alleviate
some of the confusion caused by names such as "ambulatory surgical
center," 75 "medical suite,",76 and "out-of-hospital health facility."77
A court will also be able to look to Framingham Clinic as persuasive
authority for interpreting the legislative intent behind a zoning ordi-
nance in which terms such as "hospital" and "office" are not de-
72, - Mass. at -, 415 N.E.2d at 847. The court noted a similarity between the
terms "hospital" and "clinic" in a Massachusetts licensing statute, MAss. AN. LAWS
ch. I 11, § 52 (Law. Co-op. 1975). The only significant difference was that hospitals
provide inpatient, as well as outpatient, care. Despite the similarity of terms, the
court stated that the statutory definitions were unrelated to the interpretation of the
by-law. Id. See also County of Lake v. Gateway Houses Found., 19 IM. App. 3d 318,
325, 311 N.E.2d 371, 377 (1974) (definition in a state statute is irrelevant when inter-
preting a local zoning ordinance). Cf. Manchester v. Phillips, 343 Mass. 591, 593 n.3,
180 N.E.2d 333, 335 n.3 (1962) (definitions in state licensing statute could not be used
to interpret a zoning by-law).
73. - Mass. at -, 415 N.E.2d at 846. Framingham's by-law only permitted two
assisting personnel in any professional office located within a residential district. The
court held that this provision should be interpreted to allow more than two assistants
in a less restrictive business district. Id.
Since the clinic would be run for profit, the court noted that it might also be charac-
terized as a "business office." - Mass. at -, 415 N.E.2d at 847 n.9.
74. Id. at -, 415 N.E.2d at 849. The court conceded that if the submitted affida-
vits had indicated that the Clinic would be larger than six rooms or more heavily used
than other generically similar uses permitted in the district, it may have supported the
denial of the building permit. Id.
The other generically similar medical and medical-related facilities located in
Framingham are: Oral Surgery Associates, Inc.; Trinity Medical Health Association,
Inc.; Anesthesia Associates of Framingham, Inc.; Veterinary Clinic; Cardio-Thoracic
Surgery Associates, Inc.; Harrington Cardiology Associates, Inc.; Radiology Associ-
ates of Framingham, Inc.; Associated Psychologists, Inc.; a weight-loss clinic and an
institute for marital and sexual counseling. Brief of Appellants, supra note 2, at 25.
75. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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fined.7" Any proposed structure within the range of ordinary
meanings of permitted uses should be allowed as a matter of law.79
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's approach of looking to
the actual function of a proposed facility will also greatly aid courts
in the difficult task of construing zoning laws to accommodate con-
troversial but valid uses.
Finally, the decision in Framingham Clinic should serve as a model
for several groups. For abortion clinics attempting to locate in poten-
tially hostile municipalities, the value of Framingham Clinic is clear.
A first trimester abortion clinic attempting to locate in a district per-
mitting "hospitals" and "professional offices" should be granted a
building permit as a matter of law.80 In addition, the Framingham
Clinic decision will deter zoning administrators from excluding abor-
tion clinics from their communities by a bad faith construction of the
zoning ordinance. 8' The general rule for courts to realize in future
cases is that the label applied to a clinic is less important than its
actual function."
Mitchell H. Herzog
78. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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